Causal Modeling and the Efficacy of Action

This paper brings together Thompson's naive action explanation with interventionist modeling of causal structure to show how they work together to produce causal models that go beyond current modeling capabilities, when applied to specifically selected systems. By deploying well-justified assumptions about rationalization, we can strengthen existing causal modeling techniques' inferential power in cases where we take ourselves to be modeling causal systems that also involve actions. The internal connection between means and end exhibited in naive action explanation has a modal strength like that of distinctively mathematical explanation, rather than that of causal explanation. Because it is stronger than causation, it can be treated as if it were merely causal in a causal model without thereby overextending the justification it can provide for inferences. This chapter introduces and demonstrate the usage of the Rationalization condition in causal modeling, where it is apt for the system(s) being modeled, and to provide the basics for incorporating R variables into systems of variables and R arrows into DAGs. Use of the Rationalization condition supplements causal analysis with action analysis where it is apt

What Would Hume Say? Regularities, Laws, and Mechanisms

This chapter examines the relationship between laws and mechanisms as approaches to characterising generalizations and explanations in science. I give an overview of recent historical discussions where laws failed to satisfy stringent logical criteria, opening the way for mechanisms to be investigated as a way to explain regularities in nature. This followed by a critical discussion of contemporary debates about the role of laws versus mechanisms in describing versus explaining regularities. I conclude by offering new arguments for two roles for laws that mechanisms cannot subsume, one epistemically optimistic and one pessimistic, both broadly Humean. Do note that this piece is not primarily Hume exegesis; it is more of a riff in the key of Hume

Patterns, Information, and Causation

This paper articulates an account of causation as a collection of information-theoretic relationships between patterns instantiated in the causal nexus. I draw on Dennett’s account of real patterns to characterize potential causal relata as patterns with specific identification criteria and noise tolerance levels, and actual causal relata as those patterns instantiated at some spatiotemporal location in the rich causal nexus as originally developed by Salmon. I develop a representation framework using phase space to precisely characterize causal relata, including their degree of counterfactual robustness, causal profiles, causal connectivity, and privileged grain size. By doing so, I show how the philosophical notion of causation can be rendered in a format that is amenable for direct application of mathematical techniques from information theory such that the resulting informational measures are causal informational measures. This account provides a metaphysics of causation that supports interventionist semantics and causal modeling and discovery techniques

The Hodgsonian account of temporal experience

This chapter offers a overview of Shadworth Hodgson's account of experience as fundamentally temporal, an account that was deeply influential on thinkers such as William James and which prefigures the phenomenology of Husserl in many ways. I highlight eight key features that are characteristic of Hodgson's account, and how they hang together to provide a coherent overall picture of experience and knowledge. Hodgson's account is then compared to Husserl's, and I argue that Hodgson's account offers a better target for projects such as neurophenomenology than does Husserl's. Hodgson's account is historically important as a culmination of a certain trajectory of British Empiricist thought. It offers a substantive alternative for how to think about temporality and experience in contemporary discussions, not just of the present moment but of the relationship between experience and knowledge more broadly

Two Causal Mistakes in Wegner's Illusion of Conscious Will

Daniel Wegner argues that our feelings of conscious will are illusory: these feelings are not causally involved in the production of action, which is rather governed by unconscious neural processes. I argue that Wegner's interpretation of neuroscientific results rests on two fallacious causal assumptions, neither of which are supported by the evidence. Each assumption involves a Cartesian disembodiment of conscious will, and it is this disembodiment that results in the appearance of causal inefficacy, rather than any interesting features of conscious will. Wegner's fallacies illustrate two take-away points to heed if making claims about the causal structure of agency

The Academic and Psychological Effects of Teaching Students with Learning Disabilities to Solve Problems Using Cognitive and Metacognitive Strategies

The research conduced in this study addressed the question: what are the academic and psychological effects of teaching students with learning disabilities to solve word problems using cognitive and metacognitive strategies? During the study, metacognitive and cognitive strategies are employed by a teacher in her middle school math class composed of students with various disabilities. It included using a prescribed method to approach each word problem presented, followed by reflection questions that tracked students’ growth in self-confidence. The researcher documents the exact methods used and utilizes related research literature as a basis for this study. She reflects on the both success and struggles in implementing this method in a special education math classroom. These main areas of study were focused on students improving on solving a variety of word problem, how that growth compared to their overall math growth, and changes in their problem solving self-confidence as they grew familiar with these methods. The research found that 8th graders made bigger gains by using the strategies to solve word problems, while 6th graders grew more in overall math skills

Mental Causation

The problem of mental causation in contemporary philosophy of mind concerns the possibility of holding two different views that are in apparent tension. The first is physicalism, the view that there is nothing more to the world than the physical. The second is that the mental has genuine causal efficacy in a way that does not reduce to pure physical particle-bumping. This article provides a historical background to this question, with focus on Davidson’s anomalous monism and Kim’s causal exclusion problem. Responses to causal exclusion are categorized in terms of six different argumentative strategies. In conclusion, caution is advised regarding the inclination to reduce the mental to the physical and sketch a positive direction for substantively characterizing mental causation by recourse to well-confirmed accounts of causation coupled with empirical research

Two Causal Mistakes in Wegner's Illusion of Conscious Will

Daniel Wegner argues that our feelings of conscious will are illusory: these feelings are not causally involved in the production of action, which is rather governed by unconscious neural processes. I argue that Wegner's interpretation of neuroscientific results rests on two fallacious causal assumptions, neither of which are supported by the evidence. Each assumption involves a Cartesian disembodiment of conscious will, and it is this disembodiment that results in the appearance of causal inefficacy, rather than any interesting features of conscious will. Wegner's fallacies illustrate two take-away points to heed if making claims about the causal structure of agency

The Causal Structure of Conscious Agency

This dissertation presents a new approach to modeling the causal structure of conscious agency, with a foundation in the metaphysics of causation and empirical tools for incorporating scientific results into an enriched causal model of agency. I use an interventionist causal analysis and experimental evidence from cognitive science to demonstrate that conscious awareness plays several significant causal roles in action. I then consider metaphysical challenges to this approach, and demonstrate that higher level causes such as awareness are legitimately causal.I expose the flawed understanding of causation required for inferring the causal inertness of awareness from experimental evidence. This leads to a differentiation between metaphysical causal questions, about the nature of causation itself, from empirical questions, which apply causal analysis to actual systems in the world. I challenge the practice of focusing on the awareness of agency in order to address the causal role of awareness in agency on the grounds that it inappropriately internalizes conscious agency. To demonstrate how we ought to incorporate scientific results into philosophical theories of agency, I offer an empirically enriched view of conscious agency. I rely on an interventionist approach to develop an evidentiary framework to ascertain the extent to which conscious awareness is a causal factor in action. Based on results from automatism research, I demonstrate at least three important ways in which awareness is a major causal contributor to human action: conscious intentions or goals; conscious perceptual information relevant to the goal; and conscious execution. I then address the problematic assumption that 'higher level' causes are derivative from lower level ones. I introduce the notion of counterfactual robustness to show how, for single tokens of causation, microphysical explanations are often explanatorily inferior to macrophysical ones, and distort the explanandum. I allay concerns about my variable choice by showing that we cannot, even in principle, replace higher level variables such as awareness with lower level variables such as neuronal processing. I introduce the notion of causal articulation in complex systems as the means by which higher level causes have lower level effects, while avoiding problems encountered by other theories of downward causation

Running Causation Aground

The reduction of grounding to causation, or each to a more general relation of which they are species, has sometimes been justified by the impressive inferential capacity of structural equation modelling, causal Bayes nets, and interventionist causal modelling. Many criticisms of this assimilation focus on how causation is inadequate for grounding. Here, I examine the other direction: how treating grounding in the image of causation makes the resulting view worse for causation. The distinctive features of causal modelling that make this connection appealing are distorted beyond use by forcing them to fit onto grounding. The very inferential strength that makes causation attractive is only possible because of a narrow construal of what counts as a causal relation; as soon as that broadens, the inferential capacity markedly diminishes. Making causation suitable for application to grounding spoils what was appealing about causation for this task in the first place. However, grounding need not appeal to causation: causal modelling does not have exclusive claim to structural equation modeling or other formal techniques of modelling structure. I offer a case in favour of a different kind of metaphysical frugality, which tend towards narrow, more restrictive construals of relations like causation or grounding, because then each relation behaves more homogenously. This more homogenous behavior delivers stronger inferential power per relation even though there may be more relations to which one is committed